Towards Institutional Accountability | The climate crisis, inequality and developing mechanisms to protect climate-displaced individuals

Introduction

Climate-induced disasters are shaping global migratory patterns, causing immense disruption, and dislocating many individuals from their homes. While the direct effects of climate change are discussed and well-recognized, there remains uncertainty on how to address the effects from a human rights perspective. By 2050, the number of possible climate migrants is expected to be around 200 million. This means 1 in every 45 individuals would have been displaced by the weather, exceeding the current global migration population. [1] Yet, despite this looming humanitarian crisis, there continues to be no consensus on how to refer to individuals dislocated from their homes due to climate change.

Language is important in helping to drive action and bring attention to the plight of those fleeing their homes. Yet, there is a grey area in the preferential term to describe individuals influenced by climate-induced disasters. The question of which definition can best be used to describe climate-displaced individuals (CDIs) [2] is contested amongst international human rights lawyers, such as the resistance shown by the UNCHR towards expanding the definition of a “refugee”.[3] The inability to decide on terminology, to describe how those displaced by the climate are referred to, is reflective of a deeper, systematic issue of privilege-driven indecisiveness. This lack of widespread, global consensus is also representative of our inequal society. The institutional disconnect from the local and lived experience on the ground, perpetuates inaction and jeopardises the fate of individuals displaced due to climate change. Surely, the lack of a clear, mutually understood definition detracts from more important efforts, such as the protection of currently at-risk individuals and preventing the advent of climate-induced global mass migration and humanitarian disasters?

Background  

Climate change is emerging as one of the most severe challenges facing our planet in the 21st century, with changes in global temperature increasing the frequency of natural disasters, environmental hazards, and extreme weather changes.[4] Environmental phenomena, such as desertification, sea-level rise, ocean acidification, and frequent flooding, has a direct effect on the livelihoods and safety of impacted populations. However, climate change is only one part of the story, and there are multiple, multifaceted dimensions which can influence if a person becomes a CDI. Often, the economic instability and environmentally induced stressors, caused by climate change, can also aggravate conflicts. In turn, this threatens national security and political instability, increasing the likelihood of armed conflict over resources, causing individuals to flee, and become displaced.  To put the numbers into perspective, in 2020, there were 40.5 new displacements and 9.8 million of these people were displaced due to conflict (across 42 countries and territories). The remaining 30.7 million were due to disasters (across 145 countries and territories).[5]

Furthermore, climate change disproportionally affects those who have contributed less to the problem, shedding light on global inequality and the divide between the global North and South.[6] Generally, developing countries are more vulnerable, as often their livelihoods often depend on natural resources, meaning the effects are felt more steeply and quickly. In addition, frail infrastructure, rapidly growing populations, and limited access to adaptive measures, heighten the vulnerability of developing nations. There are many ways climate change can manifest and exert a negative impact on these populations. For example, the increase in temperature can lead to extreme drought, effectively compromising access to fishing and farming, and limiting produce and the availability of food. This resource scarcity can lead to an increase in food pricing, disproportionally hurting those from lower socio-economic backgrounds. This poverty and loss of livelihood can also make unsafe trades, such as trafficking and prostitution, increase in prevalence.  Pollution in the air and water can contribute to cancers, increase the spread of diseases like malaria, and lead to cardiovascular problems. Extreme heat also exacerbates the risk of lung damage due to smoke inhalation from the increased frequency of forest fires.[7]

It has also been found that some areas are more geographically prone to the effects of climate change than others. Analysis of conflicts over extended periods of time has found a link between climate change and climate variability and conflict in the tropics. Spatial-temporal patterns of conflict also show there is a greater concentration and intensity in the Middle East, South, and Southeast Asia, and Central and Eastern Africa, particularly during the El Niño years.[8]  Specifically, these hot spots of conflicts overlap with the relatively arid and semi-arid regions of the global South, regions that are experiencing the effects of climate change at a steeper rate.[9] Thus, not only is climate change variable in how it geographically impacts some regions more than others, it also is an amplifier for pre-existing political, social, and cultural stressors.

Discussion

The case of Bangladesh: Weak governments and drowning citizens

Bangladesh is one of the first and hardest-hit countries to encounter the adverse effects exerted by global warmer temperatures. Its unique geographic location, the dominance of floodplains, low elevation, high population density, high lives of poverty, and dependence on its natural resources, made this country vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Climate change has slowly eroded the assets of the land, stripping away investments, futures, communities, and the state at large. The number of internally displaced people is increasing at an alarming rate, continuously jeopardising the social and political stability.

This forced migration within and across countries, has resulted in human insecurities, galvanizing progress towards the SDG goals and equality. With this widespread movement of people, women have been suffering more than men. During the influx and out-flow, there is also an increased risk of sexual violence and harassment against women as they transition to the new destination.[10]  This often the case, with women requiring extra support to access credit and secure livelihoods during and after a disaster.[11] Other exacerbating vulnerability factors, for individuals in Bangladesh and also those impacted by similar crises, included poverty, sickness, old age, disability, lack of parental care, and pre-existing status of being a migrant or minority.[12]

Bangladesh has a poor and institutionally weak regime, making political instability and violent conflict more likely.[13]  Climate-related stressors amplify social tensions, increasing the likelihood of anti-government movements and violent conflict. Economic instability continues to spread, with deepening poverty perpetuated by climate changed induced impacts. Food insecurity, freshwater crises, and soil degradation are affecting the livelihood patterns all contribute to a future of economic instability and political unease. Lack of economic growth is likely to reduce popular support for the government, resulting in the breakdown of social harmony and cohesion, amplifying competition over scarce resources, and increasing stress on political leadership and state structures. There is also an increase in the risk of extremist activity, with poverty and desperation making an ideal recruiting ground. Large scale migration caused by these factors can further perpetuate conflicts at various levels of the state. For example, group vs. group conflict (i.e., between Bengali and tribal people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts), state vs. group conflicts, and state vs state conflicts (i.e., between India and Bangladesh).

The case of Bangladesh highlights how climate change, and those displaced by it, are not merely victims of the changing climate. Rather, climate change is a threat multiplier causing widespread instability which socio-political environments and deepening existing tensions or opening new threats which disrupt the intricate fabric which upholds a stable society.  The impacts of climate change not only cause displacement, but also challenge development efforts, threatens human security, and the future of a society and nation. It illustrates how quickly the situation can escalate and destabilise the lives of billions. It begs the question, does the climate-induced crisis need to increase in severity, resulting in armed conflict, for impacted individuals to be recognised and protected by international frameworks?

Accountability: Towards a Common Definition

Despite the dire need to intervene and offer protection to individuals adversely impacted by the climate, a lack of consensus remains in how CDIs are referred to. The terms “climate refugees” or migrants is not recognised at an international institutional level.[14] [15] The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, coins a “refugee” as “someone is unable or unwilling to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for regions of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion”.[16] This definition can also be contextually extended to include individuals fleeing “events seriously disturbing public order”.[17] A claim for refugee status is valid when the effects of climate change interact with armed conflict and violence to cause a clear threat to one’s safety. While CDIs, fleeing unbearable conditions, resemble the same plight of refugees, the legal protections afforded to refugees are not extended to them. Those fleeing from environmental harm, are not being persecuted, as they are considered to be eligible for protections from their government.[18] Conversely, traditional refugees are often the source of persecution, and are unable to receive help from their national governments, making an individual 'unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country' as required by Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.[19]  To add to this ambiguity, the term climate refugee is not endorsed by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

Today, there are nearly 20.4 million officially designated refugees under the protection of the UNHCR, however, an additional 21.5 million people are fleeing their homes due to weather hazards every year. How is it ensured that these individuals receive adequate support and are protected? To begin with, to hold institutions accountable, there needs to be a basic, common understanding on the protection of CDIs. The absence of a clear frameworks of accountability makes it difficult for international organisations and institutions to clarify and address the issue. Furthermore, official data on CIDs is non-existing and hence to why CDIs have also been referred to as the “forgotten victims of climate change”. [20]The current recommended terminology, when referring to these individuals, is “persons displaced in the context of disasters and climate change”.[21]   In terms of deciding on the right word, there are some perspectives that the sensationalist nature of the word “refugee” highlights the severity of the situation pertaining to CIDS.[22]Alternatively, when it comes to the terminology used, some take the perspective that using the term climate refugee can undermine the protections established for the pre-existing definition of refugees, creating confusion regarding the difference between the two. The term “environmental migrant” is also widely used, including by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). However, the term migrant is not always be appropriate, as it suggests a degree of autonomy in choosing to move. Lastly, another term that has recently gained popularity is “environmentally/climate displaced person” (the latter term is used throughout this brief).[23] Offering consistent terminology, is the first step to streamline conventions at the international, regional, national level. The lack of consistent language, and words to describe CDIs, contributes to the lack of urgency to create robust, legally binding instruments to protect them.  

 Despite CDIs not being covered under the 1951 Convention, there are various other instruments which apply to climate related displacement. At a national level, various countries have subsidiary protections (such as Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark) and policies to facilitate economic migration (such as New Zealand and Spain). Regional instruments include the 2009 Kampala Convention, and The Nansen Initiative (2012) and internationally, there is The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, the Human Rights Conventions, and the UN principles.[24] However, out of all six of these instruments, The Kampala Convention is the only document which is legally binding. Drafted for the protection of displaced individuals within the African continent and adopted by the African Union in October 2009, this convention outlines steps for national governments and the obligation they have towards protecting CDIs.[25]

However, fragmented political structures, under-resources, and economic challenges, means that it is not enough to rely on governments and national protection to CDIs.[26] Guidance provided by current instruments displace accountability from international institutions to national governments. For example, the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, adopted by the UN in 2018, states that governments should work to protect CDIs in their countries of arrival and devise planned relocation and visa options if it is not possible for them to return to their country of origin.[27] It fails to recognise that climate change amplifies the risk of political tensions, making it less likely they will successfully mitigate the risks imposed by climate-change induced stressors.[28] In saying this, there are some nations in which national governments have successfully represented their people. For examples, small island developing states (SIDS), such as the Maldives and Kiribati, advocate on behalf of their people and towards finding legal and policy solutions to reduce the risk of displacement from rising sea.[29] Their small population and previously sound socio-political environment, helped make this possible. However, even so, SIDS still require extensive international support to ensure they have the necessary resources to protect their people. [30]

Recommendations

The intersection between climate change and migration requires nimble and comprehensive solutions to address the multidimensional challenges. The current system of international law is not equipped to cater for climate change, with no legally binding agreements obliging countries to support these displaced individuals.  Opening the 1951 Refugee Convention may come at the risk of weakening refugee status. This would be tragic, given that individuals covered by this convention require urgent support to escape persecutions and ongoing conflict.

Rather, there is a need for additional frameworks, which are specific, targeted, and clear in their requirements. The first step in the development of these frameworks should be to agree upon clear terminology, that encompasses the struggles of CDIs and distinguishes between the different types of climates changed induced migratory pattern. This will help ensure the nuances and complexities of climate change, and the people it affects, are accounted for. Without consistent language, there is a risk of overlooking and undermining the experiences of CDIs.

Secondly, future frameworks and mechanisms, should address the three main challenges through which the inequality-aggravating effect of climate change materializers on populations. This includes (1) the increased exposure disadvantaged groups have to the adverse effects of climate change; (2) the greater susceptibility to damages caused by climate change; and (3) the reduced ability to cope and recover from the damage suffered.[31]

Thirdly, they should also ensure that sufficient protections for vulnerable groups, such as women and the elderly and grant region-specific recommendations, based on identified threats for the area. Specifically, there is an identified need for accountability structures to support CDIs from South Asia, Central America, Northwest Africa, and the Horn of Africa. [32]

Lastly, these frameworks and mechanisms should acknowledge the amplifying effect climate change has on previous socio-political stressors, and the disproportionate impact it has on already under-resourced nations states. Thus, rather than displacing accountability on national government, it should be acknowledged to be a collective responsibility for the global community. At the very least, international institutions should emphasise the importance of capacity-building within governments and ensuring they are equipped with the resources and support required to handle the multi-dimensional complexities imposed by climate change.

Conclusion

The complex manifestation of climate change means it is difficult to determine accountability and easier to remain stagnant and complacent in responding to climate-induced consequences.  Currently, no multilateral strategy or legal framework exists to account for climate change as a driver of migration. From increasing access to clean water, to causing food scarcity, agricultural degradation, and violent conflict, there is no denying climate change will intensify these challenges and be a significant factor in driving human migration patterns. Recognizing that climate change is a driver of human displacement requires the recognition of the array of human insecurities which occur concordantly. From undermining livelihoods, perpetuating conflict, and galvanizing others withstanding concomitant challenges, there is a need to recognise the widespread, detrimental impact of climate change, and to the ubiquitous threat it poses to us all. It should be unanimously agreed that the weather does not discriminate.  Ensuring there is common terminology, which describe the plight faced by CDIs and captures the extent of the problem, is the first step in ensuring climate-driven displacement is accounted for. After all, the effects of climate change may be disproportionate but, as our world continues to warm, all of humanity is at risk. Without clear language and legally binding frameworks to ensure individuals are held accountable and at a national and international level, we risk the security of our future. In the face of looming climate stressors and disasters, it is more important than ever that institutions take responsibility and set a precedence of proactive action and protection for climate-displaced individuals.

[1] G. J. Abel, et al. (2019). Climate, Conflict and Forced migration, Global Environmental Change, vol. 54, p. 241.

[2] There are multiple definitions to describe someone have who has been displaced by climate change. For consistency, the term climate-displaced individual (CDI) will be used throughout this brief.

[3] IDMC. (2020). Global Internal Displacement Database. https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data

[4] G. J. Abel, et al. (2019). Climate, Conflict and Forced migration, Global Environmental Change, vol. 54, p. 241

[5] IDMC. (2020). Global Internal Displacement Database. https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data

[6] Tedenljung, Amanda (2021). Cliamte Cahnge and Forced Migration. http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1436518/FULLTEXT01.pdf

[7] Roy, S. S. (2022). Role of ENSO on Conflicts in the Global South. Frontiers in Climate, 4, 752355. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2022.752355

[8] Roy, S. S. (2022). Role of ENSO on Conflicts in the Global South. Frontiers in Climate, 4, 752355. https://doi.org/10.3389/fclim.2022.752355

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Brock, Hannah. (2012). Climate change: drivers of insecurity in the global south. Oxford Research Group

[12] Ibid.  

[13] Brock, Hannah. (2012). Climate change: drivers of insecurity in the global south. Oxford Research Group

[14] Wilcox, S. (2021). Does Brock’s theory of migration justice adequately account for climate

refugees? Ethics & Global Politics, 14(2), 75–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/16544951.2021.1926084

[15] Tedenljung, Amanda (2021). Cliamte Cahnge and Forced Migration. http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1436518/FULLTEXT01.pdf

[16]  UNHCR. (2021). The 1951 Refugee Convention. https://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html

[17]  Organization of African Unity (OAU).  (1969). Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa ("OAU Convention"). 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36018.html 

[18] UNHCR. (2021). The 1951 Refugee Convention. https://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.htm

[19] UNHCR. (2021). The 1951 Refugee Convention. https://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html

[20] Ida, Tedsuji. (2021). Climate Refugees- The worlds forgotten victims. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/06/climate-refugees-the-world-s-forgotten-victims/

[21]  UNHCR. (2021). The 1951 Refugee Convention. https://www.unhcr.org/1951-refugee-convention.html

[22] Climate Change and Social Inequality (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Working Papers No. 152; UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Working Papers, Vol. 152). (2017). https://doi.org/10.18356/2c62335d-en

[23] [23] Ida, Tedsuji. (2021). Climate Refugees- The worlds forgotten victims. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/06/climate-refugees-the-world-s-forgotten-victims/

[24] Apap, Joanna. (2019). The Concept of ‘Climate Refugee’. European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621893/EPRS_BRI(2018)621893_EN.pdf 

[25] ibid.

[26] ibid.

[27] United Nations. (2018). Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ida, Tedsuji. (2021). Climate Refugees- The worlds forgotten victims. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/06/climate-refugees-the-world-s-forgotten-victims/

[30] Ibid.

[31] Climate Change and Social Inequality (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Working Papers No. 152; UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Working Papers, Vol. 152). (2017). https://doi.org/10.18356/2c62335d-en

[32] Climate Change and Social Inequality (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Working Papers No. 152; UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) Working Papers, Vol. 152). (2017). https://doi.org/10.18356/2c62335d-en